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Abstract
Background: Operations of transnational corporations (TNCs) affect population health through production methods,
shaping social determinants of health, or by influencing regulation of their activities. Research on community exposures
to TNC practices and policies has been limited. Our research on extractive industries examined Rio Tinto in Australia and
Southern Africa to test methods for assessing the health impacts of corporates in high and middle income jurisdictions
with different regulatory frameworks.
Methods: We adapted existing Health Impact Assessment methods. Data identifying potential impacts were sourced
through media analysis, document analysis, company literature and semi-structured interviews. The data were mapped
against a corporate health impact assessment framework (CHIA) which included Rio Tinto’s political and business
practices; productions; and workforce, social, environmental and economic conditions.
Results: Both positive and detrimental aspects of Rio Tinto’s operations were identified. Requirements imposed
by Rio Tinto on its global supply chain are likely to have positive health impacts for workers. However, political lobbying and
membership of representative organisations can influence government policy in ways that are unfavourable to health and
equity. Positive impacts include provision of direct employment under decent working conditions, but countered by an
increase in precariousness of employment. Commitments to upholding sustainable development principles are undermined
by limited site remediation and other environmental impacts. Positive contributions are made to national and local
economies but then undermined by business strategies that include tax minimisation.
Conclusion: Our study confirmed that it is possible to undertake a CHIA on an extractive industry TNC. The different
methods provided sufficient information to understand the need to strengthen regulations that are conducive to health;
the opportunity for Rio Tinto to extend corporate responsibility initiatives and support their social licence to operate; and
for civil society actors to inform their advocacy towards improving health and equity outcomes from TNC operations.
Keywords: Extractive industry, Globalization, Health equity, Transnational Corporations
Background
Introduction
Transnational corporations (TNCs) are incorporated or
unincorporated enterprises comprising parent enterprises
and their foreign affiliates. A parent enterprise controls
the assets of other entities in countries other than its
home country; usually by owning an equity capital stake
[1]. TNC revenues now exceed those of many national
governments [2]. It is estimated that TNCs directly
employ 4 % of workers in developed countries and 12% in
developing countries; with approximately 60,000 parent
TNCs, and an estimated 500,000 subsidiaries worldwide
[3]. The legal status granted to corporations in the USA,
and to differing degrees in other countries, includes the
right of legal ‘personhood’, limited shareholder liability, an
unlimited lifespan, the right to sue and be sued, and the
right to own stock [4, 5].
As major players in global value and network chains
[6] TNC operations include both products and practices
that affect population health [7]. An expanding body of
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research is being conducted on the operations of TNCs
in relation to health in many sectors, including food and
beverage [8–10], extractive, pharmaceutical, and tobacco
[11–13]. TNCs directly influence the social determinants
of health (SDH) such as employment and living condi-
tions, income, education, environmental conditions, food
environments and social support [10, 14]; and also influ-
ence the policy structures and decisions that determine
inequalities in the distribution of conditions favourable
or unfavourable to health [15]. They thereby contribute
to health inequities within or between nations [14]. The
role of national governments to cooperate to regulate
TNC operations globally, or to regulate operations
within their own jurisdictions, is inhibited by a ‘free
trade’ environment in which TNCs are able to shift
investment between countries [16]. Mining corporations
have used the environment of free trade to offshore their
operations and thereby circumvent domestic opposition
to their activities. Free trade agreements have allowed
mining companies to expand their activities, and seek
recourse in international tribunals to override local gov-
ernment sovereignty [17]. Global supply chains may also
undermine work, health and safety regulation when
corporations operate in developing countries where
regulation is often weak or absent [18].
Extractive industry TNCs take raw materials from the
earth including metals, minerals and aggregates, oil and
gas (Business Directory.com). Mining is a major compo-
nent of extractive industries. Approximately 3.5 billion
people live in countries rich in minerals, oil or gas, and
these resources play a significant role in the economies
of 81 of 195 countries worldwide; accounting for a quar-
ter of global GDP [19]. Africa alone is home to approxi-
mately 30% of the world’s mineral reserves, 10% of the
world’s oil, and approximately 8 % of the world’s natural
gas [19].
Under good governance arrangements that respect
rights, community needs and the environment, extract-
ive industry revenues can help to reduce poverty and
boost shared prosperity [17] through increased employ-
ment opportunities, improved working conditions, and
infrastructure spending [20]. National taxation revenue
from extractive industries potentially augments outlays
for health and social services [21]. Large TNCs may de-
liver needed services even when the state is absent or
delinquent as happened with retroviral services for
HIV-infected miners during a period of AIDS denialism
by the state in South Africa in the late 1990s / early
2000s [22]. Some extractive industry TNCs commit to
corporate social responsibility programs; assessing their
health, environmental and social impacts and bench-
marking these against competitors [23].
However, evidence also shows adverse social, environ-
mental and health impacts arising from extractive
industry practices [17]. Negative environmental impacts
may include soil, water and air pollution; deforestation
and erosion; dumping of hazardous wastes; and in-
creased coastal erosion and desertification [13, 24]. Im-
pacts on air quality and agricultural production may
create health risks for populations living adjacent to
mining operations, leading to environmental refugees
[17]. Mining operations can expose workers to major
physical, chemical, biological, ergonomic, psychosocial,
and occupational health hazards [25]. Downing notes a
‘resettlement effect’ on communities living near mining
operations; characterised by loss of assets (homes, com-
munities, and productive land), ‘destruction of cultural
sites, diminution of cultural identity, and disruption of
social structures, networks and mutual help mecha-
nisms’ ([26] p. 3). Available data indicate that the spread
of toxic chemicals in the environment is a public health
crisis; causing cancer, sterility, respiratory problems,
chemical hypersensitivity, birth defects, and nervous sys-
tem and vital organ dysfunctions [13]. Most toxic wastes
are externalities of industrial production in which the
costs of adverse health impacts are shifted to the wider
community [13].
Despite the impact of extractive TNCs there has been
little research to assess their overall population health
and equity impact. Accumulated evidence on SDH pro-
vides the framework for our understanding of TNC
health impacts [14] recognising that TNC practices may
directly affect the living conditions and access to services
that affect health, and may contribute to the political
and socioeconomic inequalities that cause health inequi-
ties [27]. In this paper we apply a corporate health
impact assessment (CHIA) framework to assess the
health impacts of one extractive industry (predominantly
mining) TNC, Rio Tinto, in Australia, South Africa and
Namibia; three countries with different regulatory struc-
tures and significant differences in population health
[28]. Our framework is focused on regulatory structures,
corporate practices and products, and direct impacts on
daily living conditions [29] and complements the 2018
framework by Schrecker et al. [30]. The latter framework
links the historical context of global extraction and path-
ways to ill health and the consequences for SDH.
Schrecker et al. also include an analysis of the political
economy of extractivism, focusing on the societal struc-
tures, processes, and power relationships that drive and
enable extraction [30].
Methods
Step 1: Adapting HIA methods to assess extractive TNC
operations
Health impact assessment
Health Impact Assessment (HIA) provides a structured
methodology for systematically identifying and assessing
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potential health impacts of governmental or organisa-
tional policy or practice changes and developing policy
recommendations to minimise negative, and enhance
positive, impacts [31–33]. HIAs can be used prospect-
ively to assess likely impacts in the future, or retrospect-
ively to assess impacts of past events, predict future
impacts and inform decision-making [34].
In 2015 the authors contributed to development of a
Corporate Health Impact Assessment (CHIA) Frame-
work (Fig. 1) [29, 35]; applied in this paper to identify
and assess positive and detrimental health impacts from
Rio Tinto’s corporate practices.
Selecting the extractive industry TNC
Our rationale for choosing the extractive sector was that
it has significant impacts on health [25]. We chose
Australia and Southern Africa (South Africa and
Namibia) to explore differences between Rio Tinto oper-
ations and health impacts in high and middle-income ju-
risdictions with different regulatory and socioeconomic
environments. We sought an understanding of how
regulation can reduce negative health impacts. Rio Tinto
operates in each of these jurisdictions and author (LL) is
based in South Africa.
Step 2: Identifying potential impacts
The CHIA identification stage included profiling the
population groups affected by the TNC and collecting
information to identify those most likely to experience
health impacts [36]. Factors understood to have positive
and negative impacts on physical and mental health out-
comes, relevant information relating to Rio Tinto’s glo-
bal operations within Australia and Southern Africa, and
regulatory and demographic data were collected and
mapped against the three levels of the CHIA framework.
We chose not to use the category ‘health-related behav-
iours’ as no major impacts were identified that related to
this category. We considered the global context in which
Rio Tinto operates, and how this context shapes its
practices in different countries. Our research focussed
on assessment of the health impacts relating to opera-
tions in Australia and Southern Africa, and a compari-
son between the two. Health impact was assessed in
terms of the effects of Rio Tinto corporate practices on
social determinants of health, with attention to impacts
on health inequities within or between the selected
jurisdictions.
Data were sourced from documents, websites and
list-servers, Rio Tinto’s corporate literature, media items,
and semi-structured interviews. The original data in-
cluded approximately 275 items which were added to by
later searches. We undertook a detailed description of
each of the main mining operations in each jurisdiction.
This paper provides an overview of key issues we
identified, contextualised by excerpts of interviews with
civil society actors.
Documents and websites
A keyword search of the Flinders University library hold-
ings and Google Scholar was undertaken for the period
2011–2016. The websites of key civil society activist
groups monitoring the operations of TNCs were
checked for any references to Rio Tinto. Global data on
the political, economic and regulatory context for Rio
Tinto’s activities were collected, including information
on regulatory institutions, guidelines and standards for
multinational enterprises, industry representative organi-
sations, global unions, and voluntary reporting initia-
tives. At the national and sub-national level information
relating to Rio Tinto’s operations in Australia and South-
ern Africa, and data on work health and safety, employ-
ment and wages were collected.
Items reviewed from the Rio Tinto’s website included
annual reports, sustainable development reports, global
and national taxation payments, media releases, and data
from selected Australian and Southern African produc-
tion sites. Other literature covered Rio Tinto’s voluntary
reporting initiatives.
Media items
The Factiva database was accessed to identify all news
sources under search headings relating to Rio Tinto’s in-
dustrial, economic and political news items for Australia
and South Africa between 2012 and 2016. The Proquest
International Australian and Zealand Newsstream data-
base was searched for newspaper reports relating to
Australia and South Africa for the same period. Web
based news compilations concerned with mining opera-
tions archived between 2014 and 2016 augmented the
data [37, 38].
Semi-structured interviews
Eleven semi-structured interviews were conducted to gain
perspectives on Rio Tinto’s operations in Australia and
southern Africa, including from Rio Tinto and / or the
mining industry sector, and from civil society actors and
campaigners monitoring Rio Tinto’s operations across dif-
ferent mining operations. We invited Rio Tinto and key ex-
tractive industry representatives to participate in the
research but all declined. The barriers to engaging political
and business elites as participants in academic research
have been documented [39, 40]. Civil society and NGO ac-
tors were also invited to participate. Australian participants
were identified through purposive and snowball sampling
based on high profile civil society and union campaigns in
different states. In Southern Africa respondents were iden-
tified through international union information and snow-
ball sampling facilitated by contacts in South Africa with
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an understanding of Rio Tinto’s operations. Interview
schedules were designed to elicit responses in the areas of
health impact identified across the CHIA framework. Each
potential respondent was emailed a consent form, and an
invitation to participate and project information sheet. The
11 interviews were conducted via telephone or Skype and
transcribed by professional transcription services.
Industriall Union represents 50 million workers in 140
countries in the mining, energy and manufacturing sectors
and challenges the power of multinational companies and
negotiates with them on a global level. Industriall Union
has been active against negative practices by Rio Tinto
across different jurisdictions including Namibia and South
Africa in respect of precarious employment and other
issues and has been a significant source of data for the
research [41].
Step 3: Assessment of impacts
The purpose of the CHIA assessment stage is critically
to synthesise and assess the information collected dur-
ing the identification stage, to help prioritise health im-
pacts [36]. Information from documents and websites,
media items and transcribed interviews were imported
into NVivo qualitative data analysis software and coded
against the three levels of CHIA framework shown in
Fig. 1. The areas of health impact in each jurisdiction
were coded for positive and detrimental health impacts
and aspects of corporate activity. Fortnightly team
meetings were held to discuss the progress of the
research including coding, emerging themes, and the
scope and focus of the comparative analysis of Rio
Tinto’s operations within and between the three
jurisdictions.
Fig. 1 Corporate Health Impact Assessment Framework. Conceptual pathways of the health impacts of Transnational Corporations (TNCs) on
population health
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Results
Rio Tinto’s global operations
Rio Tinto was formed in 1873 and operates in 35 coun-
tries across six continents. It is a dual listed, UK and Aus-
tralian entity managed in the UK. It is a ‘parent’ company
of many subsidiaries through strategic acquisitions, and
engages in ongoing divestment and acquisition of assets
[41, 42]. Rio Tinto has approximately 200,000 share-
holders, and 47,000 staff including approximately 25,000
in Australasia and 5000 in Africa [43]. These figures in-
clude the Group’s share of joint ventures and associates.
Industriall Union states that Rio Tinto does not report its
large numbers of sub-contracted workers [44], meaning
the total number of workers is unclear.
Rio Tinto’s business is diversified across five groups:
iron ore, copper, energy (coal and uranium), diamonds
and minerals [45]. Globally, in 2017 the Group’s direct
economic contribution was US$41.8 billion including
US$27.7 billion in payments to employees, governments,
and returns to capital. In 2017 it invested US$176
million across approximately 1300 programmes covering
the health, education, housing, environmental protection
and agricultural and business development sectors [43,
46]. This represents 0.44% of the corporation’s US$40
billion sales revenue [47]. In 2017 Rio Tinto paid US$5.1
billion in taxes (corporate taxes, royalties, fees, property
taxes, employment taxes and irrecoverable indirect taxes
borne by the corporation) globally [48].
Rio Tinto states ‘All our sites must have a complaints,
disputes and grievance mechanism that meets the UN
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights cri-
teria’ [49, 50] and rules set by the World Trade Organ-
isation, the International Labour Organisation and other
international institutions regulating work health and
safety. These Guiding Principles recognise states’ exist-
ing obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human
rights and fundamental freedoms. Business enterprises,
as specialised arms of society are also expected to com-
ply with all relevant laws and to respect human rights.
Rights and obligations must be matched with appropri-
ate and effective remedies when breached. Importantly,
the Guiding Principles apply to all states, and to business
enterprises, both transnational and others, irrespective
of size, sector, location, ownership and structure.
However, the 2012 report of the African Commission’s
Working Group on Indigenous populations ([24] p. 66)
states that while Rio Tinto makes specific mention of
free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) in its commu-
nity agreements, based on the UN Guiding Principles, it
does not make binding commitments to achieve FPIC.
Rio Tinto is also a signatory to several voluntary report-
ing initiatives which are proxies for formal regulations.
It operates without any international agreement on tax-
ation obligations, as none has been mandated.
Rio Tinto’s political practices
Rio Tinto is a member of the Australian Chamber of
Commerce, which is part of the International Business
Industry Advisory Committee [51] to the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
[52]. It is a member of the Minerals Council of Australia
(MCA) and Business Council of Australia (BCA), and is
represented on both boards and respective committees
[53, 54]. The MCA is the peak body of Australia’s ex-
tractive industry sector [55]. The BCA provides a forum
for businesses to directly contribute to public policy de-
bates [56]. Rio Tinto is also a member of the mining in-
dustry employer organisation, the Chamber of Mines in
South Africa and Namibia [57]. In 2017 the corporation
retained the Rio Tinto Lobby Group and Smith-Free
lobbyists to lobby the US government on regulation of
environmental issues, natural resources, taxes, trade and
federal appropriations [58]. Rio Tinto’s Political Action
Committee donated US $63,000 to political actors in the
2016 US election [59]. The corporation is a member of
the World Coal Association which is an accredited ob-
server to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) [60], where it lobbies to
undermine renewable energy policies [61]. Rio Tinto has
approximately 500 controlled entities, nine of which are
resident in tax havens, [43].
Rio Tinto’s business practices
Rio Tinto incorporates major supply chains with prod-
ucts that require large rail and shipping infrastructure.
In 2017 Rio Tinto’s global supply chain included 31,000
suppliers to whom it paid US$14.1 billion for goods and
services, governed under a new Supplier Code of Con-
duct [62]. This code details the expectations of suppliers,
their subsidiaries and sub-contractors, with provisions
including avoidance of forced, compulsory or child
labour, promoting humane treatment, and respecting
workers’ rights to join trade unions [63]. A confidential
and independently operated multilingual ‘whistleblow-
ing’ service is available to Rio Tinto employees, contrac-
tors, suppliers and customers [64]. Rio Tinto has also
signed a Slavery and Human Trafficking statement
which meets the requirements of the UK Modern Slav-
ery Act 2015 [65, 66]. Compliance is particularly critical
for operations in South Africa where the population liv-
ing in some form of slavery is approximately 25 times
larger than in Australia [67].
Corporate social responsibility
Rio Tinto is a signatory to a range of corporate social re-
sponsibility mechanisms including the Corporate
Responsibility Index, Global Reporting Initiative, London
Benchmarking Group, FTSE4Good Index, Carbon
Disclosure Project, Extractive Industries Transparency
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Initiative, and the UN Global Compact which encour-
ages businesses to adopt and report on sustainable and
socially responsible policies [68]. However, corporate so-
cial responsibility has been criticised as a means for cor-
porations to deflect the threat of direct regulation and
protect commercial interests [69]. Within the scope of
their operations, TNCs can be simultaneously socially
responsible and irresponsible [70]. Voluntary codes have
little public accountability, are difficult to reinforce, and
rely on negative publicity. They also divert attention
away from legal compliance, and third party monitoring
by NGOs is of limited effectiveness [71]. Research on
Rio Tinto’s corporate social responsibility commitments
arguably reveals that it departs from these in remote re-
gions in developing nations with poorer governance
structures and corruption amongst officials [24, 72].
Rio Tinto’s Australian, South African, and Namibian
operations
Rio Tinto works in different socioeconomic contexts ran-
ging from high income and strongly democratic countries
to those with much lower incomes and weaker democratic
regimes. Table 1 presents the basic demographic data for
Australia, a high income country, and South Africa and
Namibia, which are both middle income jurisdictions, to
provide insights into the comparative operating contexts.
Rio Tinto’s 83% foreign-owned Australian operations ac-
count for approximately half the corporation’s global assets
through the production of iron ore, bauxite, uranium, alu-
minium, diamonds and salt from more than 30 operating
sites and processing plants. Rio Tinto ranks third in the
top 2000 companies in Australia [73]. In Southern Africa,
it mines uranium at Rössing in Namibia and mineral sands
at Richards Bay in South Africa.
Rio Tinto’s political practices in the selected jurisdic-
tions include tax minimisation practices, lobbying gov-
ernment directly, or via industry representative bodies,
and collaborating with and funding the university sector
to conduct research.
Taxation practices
Of the US $5.1 billion tax paid globally in 2017, US$3.8
billion was paid in Australia, including US$1877 million
in corporate income taxes and US$1644 in royalties [48].
This compares with US$93 million in South Africa, in-
cluding US$81 million in corporate taxes, US11 million
in royalties and US$22 million in payroll tax. In Namibia
a total of US$7 million was paid: US$6 million in cor-
porate taxes and US$1 million in royalties [48]. A 2011
report for the Centre for Research on Multinational Cor-
porations stated that Rio Tinto is transparent with re-
gard to taxes and other contributions to the Namibian
government from its majority owned company Rössing
Uranium and, of four uranium mining corporations
operating in Africa, it provided the most transparency
on taxes, royalties, and other financial contributions
[74]. In 2017 the Group’s effective tax rate on underlying
earnings was 28.2% [48].
The Australian Taxation Office is auditing Rio Tinto
regarding profit shifting through marketing hubs in
Singapore which imposed a taxation rate of 5 % on Rio
Tinto’s $790 million profit in 2014 [75]. Tax reductions
facilitated by lobbying governments for mining-related
tax deductions, together with legally available taxation-
minimisation strategies, highlights the disparity between
the economic obligations of individual taxpayers and
those of corporations [76]. While it is difficult to quan-
tify the level of taxation avoided by TNCs including Rio
Tinto, it is sufficient to warrant Australian Taxation
Office concerns [77].
Lobbying governments
Over the last decade Australian mining lobby groups raised
revenue of $541,275,884 including $203,594,120 by the
MCA [78]. Lobbying by Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton in
Australia between 2007 and 2016 averted an inquiry into
supply and demand in the $75 billion iron ore industry, es-
pecially concentration of market power in two very large
companies [79]. Rio Tinto also lobbied to maintain dis-
counted diesel fuel for mining companies [80] and the
mining industry successfully lobbied against the Australian
Minerals Resource Rent Tax (‘mining tax’) on extractive in-
dustry ‘super profits’ [81, 82] which was repealed by gov-
ernment [78]. Tax concessions allowable on the lobbying
expenses paid by the mining industry from 2007 to 2016
represented a loss to Australian taxpayers of $162.4 million
[78]. Rio Tinto’s policy-related submissions include pro-
moting workforce ‘flexibility’ [83], and support for fossil
fuels [84].
No information was available on direct lobbying by
Rio Tinto in South Africa or Namibia which may be
actioned indirectly through industry bodies.
University collaboration and funding
Rio Tinto is involved in a number of Australian research
partnerships and university scholarships. The corpora-
tion’s educational portal SMART supports secondary
teaching and learning in maths, science, business studies
and geography [85]. The increasingly close relationship
between fossil fuel industries and universities highlights
the potential for conflicts of interest [86, 87]. In 1999
the MCA established the Minerals Tertiary Education
Council (MTEC), which aims to provide greater input
into course materials [86]. Rio Tinto also offers Austra-
lian university scholarships, and bursaries and intern-
ships at South Africa’s major tertiary institutions [88].
Universities can vary significantly in their approaches to
management of competing interests [89], raising
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concerns over institutional decision-making [87], aca-
demic freedom [86] and rigorous use of research. A re-
view of literature on community funding by Rio Tinto
reveals an apparent preference for projects supporting
business and education partnerships [90] and ecological
or zoological studies [91] rather than for preventing or
lessening negative environmental or social impacts from
their operations.
Major health impacts of Rio Tinto operations
Here we summarise (see Table 2) key positive and nega-
tive aspects of Rio Tinto’s operations in respect of health
and /or health equity in relation to workforce, social, en-
vironmental and economic conditions within Australia
and Southern Africa. Civil society respondents gave par-
ticular emphasis to issues including the limitations of
the broader regulatory environment, employment, and
Table 1 Comparative demographic data Australia, South Africa and Namibia
Demographic domain Australia South Africa Namibia
Population (million) 23.9 53.5 2.5
Life expectancy (OECD average 80.9 years) 82.4 57.2 64
Unemployment rate 6.1 26.7 28.1
Income inequality -Gini coefficient (OECD average 0.31) 0.337 0.634 0.572
Relative poverty rate (OECD average 11.0) 12.8 53.8 45.7
GDP per capita (000 $USD PPP) (OECD average 41.2) 46.7 13.7 9
Tertiary education 25–64 years (OECD average 35.7) 42.9 6.4 < 10
Number of International Labor Organization (ILO) Conventions ratified 58 54 11
a) Fundamental a) 7 of 8 a) 8 of 8 a) 8 of 8
b) Governance b) 3 of 4 b) 2 of 4 b) 1 of 4
c) Technical c) 48 of 177 c)17 of 177 c) 2 of 177
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2017:
Rank by country 1–89 13 71 53
Corruption Perception Index (CPI - 77) (CPI - 43) (CPI - 51)
World Bank: Regulatory Quality
Perceptions of government ability to formulate and implement sound
policies and regulations
(2016 percentile rank 0–100)
97.60 62.02 49.52
World Bank: Government Effectiveness
Perceptions of quality of public / civil services and degree of independence
from political pressures, quality of policy formulation / implementation,
and credibility of government commitment.
2016 percentile rank 0–100
92.31 64.90 60.10
World Bank: Voice / Accountability
Perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate
in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression and association
and a free media
2016 percentile rank 0–100
94.09 67.98 66.50
World Bank: Political stability and absence of violence
Perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically motivated
violence including terrorism
2016 percentile rank 0–100
81.90 42.38 70.00
World Bank: Rule of law
Perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by
the rules, quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, courts,
and the likelihood of crime and violence
2016 percentile rank 0–100
95.19 58.17 64.42
World Bank: Control of corruption
Perception of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain
including corruption and ‘capture’ by private interests
2016 percentile rank 0–100
93.27 65.87 64.42
Average Salary 2018 (world ranking): US$88,275 [160] US$47,046 [161] US$22,927 [63]
Purchasing power parity ranking comparison (per capita of GDP) 15 91 115
Source: OECD,The World Economic Forum, Business Tech, World Bank, ILO, Transparency International, World Bank [162–174]
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impacts on health, social, and environmental conditions,
and these views are included in the four domains de-
fined in level 3 of the CHIA framework.
Workforce and working conditions
Employment is a critical determinant of health. While
secure, safe, adequately-paid work is positive for health,
insecure, lower-status work can have adverse health im-
pacts [92]. Our data examined the comparative employ-
ment conditions across the jurisdictions; information on
wages and conditions and work health and safety. Some
positive aspects include the thousands of jobs provided
by Rio Tinto across Australia, South Africa and Namibia
[93]. A Namibian activist noted that Rio Tinto employs
many non-skilled labourers at the Rössing site who
would otherwise have difficulty in gaining employment.
In 2016 Rio Tinto employed approximately 950 workers
at Rössing of whom 78.2% were men formerly disadvan-
taged by apartheid policies [94]. Rio Tinto is also one of
the largest private sector employers of Indigenous
Table 2 Summary Rio Tinto’s impacts on social determinants of health and equity in Australia and Southern Africa




Requirements imposed by Rio Tinto on its global
supply chain are likely to have positive health
impacts for workers
Political lobbying
Membership of representative organisations
to influence public policy in ways unfavourable
to health equity, while protecting corporate image
Workforce and
working conditions
Provision of direct employment under decent
working conditions
Low, and falling rates of illness and injury for
direct employees
A global ‘whistleblower’ program is available to
workers and all stakeholders
[stet]: Australia has a high proportion of Rio
Tinto’s global workforce, with an inclusive
approach for Indigenous and female workers.
Southern Africa: Richards Bay Minerals is a major
South African employer.
Increase in precarious, lower-paid working conditions
due to practices of contracting labour through
third-party organisations
Legal responsibility for workers is reduced
Adverse health impacts on contract workers not
‘visible’ in corporate reporting mechanisms.
Increased worker incentives to work unsafely
Complex corporate structure may impede union efforts
to mediate negative working conditions.
Australia: Most Australian workers are contracted through
labour hire organisations. FIFO operations may have
negative impacts on health and well-being
Southern Africa: Contract workers lack the benefits of direct
employees. Relatively worse working conditions for contracted
workers in Southern Africa likely to have worse health impacts
than for contracted workers in Australia, eg occupational injury
rates. Recourse to legal measures to seek compensation for
adverse impacts weaker than in Southern Africa
Social conditions Rio Tinto provides some benefits to affected communities
Australia: Increased local Aboriginal participation in
the Rio Tinto workforce
Southern Africa: Richards Bay Minerals supports
infrastructure, local procurement, skills and enterprise
development, and joint ventures to facilitate skills transfer.
The Rössing Foundation undertakes a broad range of
community development activities.
Rio Tinto operations impact negatively in mining localities
Australia: Relatively high miners’ wages can increase prices for
goods and services in local communities.
Negative community impacts from noise and air pollution
from coal mining
Psychological distress resulting from social disruption and
environmental damage.
Southern Africa: Migrant workers disrupt communities in
vicinity of mining operations
Environmental
conditions
Commitment to upholding sustainable development principles
Rio Tinto signed up to International Council on Mining and
Metals principles for sustainable development
Disclosures under the Global Reporting Index may support
the Paris Agreement to reduce global warming
Australia: Commitment made to progressively return the area
of the Ranger Uranium mine to a viable ecosystem under
government supervision.
Southern AfricaRichards Bay Minerals monitors emissions for
air quality. Rossing Uranium monitors dust levels on site and
in nearby town.
Environmental risk to health and lack of remediation
Failure to remediate large final voids leaves a negative
environmental legacy. Divestment may result in avoidance
of responsibility for site remediation or adverse impacts of
environmental damage
Australia: Aboriginal community concerns over negative
impacts from spills, and breaches of licence conditions
at the Ranger uranium mine.
Southern AfricaWorkers at Rossing exposed to dust
and radon gas.
Air pollution, biodiversity loss and soil contamination
at Richards Bay Minerals
Economic
conditions
Contribution to national and local economies
Rio Tinto’s direct global economic contribution is made
through payments to workers, suppliers, governments
and community development programs.
Australia: A high proportion of global taxation is paid
in Australia
Southern Africa: Richards Bay Minerals is the largest
taxpayer in KwaZuluNatal.
Business strategies impact on revenue for social investment
Profit shifting and/or tax reduction strategies reduce government
revenues available for health and social investment.
Economic costs of damage to environments and/or health
are externalised to states and communities.
Australia: Lobbying by the mining industry against the
‘mining tax’ and for fuel subsidies results in loss of government
revenue available for public good purposes.
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Australians, with over 1431 full time Indigenous em-
ployees in 2017 [93]. The corporation also states its
commitment to gender equity [95]. Positive workforce
issues noted by Australian respondents included a high
quality graduate program, redundancy package funding,
and improved rosters for ‘fly in fly out’ (FIFO) workers.
FIFO employment in Australia can place a heavy strain
on workers and their families, with potential adverse im-
pacts on health and wellbeing [96].
However, these positive aspects are curtailed by high
levels of casual contractors, with less favourable employ-
ment conditions affecting an estimated 70% of Rio Tin-
to’s global workforce [97]. Industriall Union argues that
Rio Tinto is not transparent about the extent to which it
employs precarious workers and does not disclose how
many people work on sites; reporting only direct em-
ployees [97]. Many of these precarious workers are in
casual and temporary roles, and are employed by labour
hire firms or are self-employed [97].
Casual contractors are employed in Australia, South
Africa and Namibia, with Rio Tinto now only using con-
tract labour for its Australian iron ore operations [98].
The National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) reports
that precarious workers outnumber permanent workers
at Rio Tinto’s Richards Bay Minerals operation [99].
In 2015 the Mineworkers Union of Namibia delivered
Rio Tinto’s Rössing uranium mine management a peti-
tion demanding an end to the exploitation of contrac-
tors, which included paying some contractors only
one-seventh the wage of regular workers, forcing them
to work longer hours with less job security, and claimed
victimisation of union members [100–102]. The union
has also reported concerns over violations of sub-con-
tractors’ right to freedom of association and right to col-
lective bargaining [99]. A Namibian respondent
explained:
Yes they have contract workers and the contract
workers are dependent on the contractor … Rössing
has not got the same obligations to contract workers as
to their permanent workers and that makes it very
difficult. They get exchanged quickly, they haven’t got
medical aid, they haven’t got a pension fund and the
Rössing workers have that.
Industriall Union’s 2014 global campaign against precar-
ious work practices by Rio Tinto in Namibia argued that
the company refused to address the concerns of the
workers via their union representatives; did not comply
with the Labour Act /Agreement that prohibits employers
from unilaterally changing conditions of employment; and
that they negotiated in bad faith by withholding critical in-
formation during negotiations [103]. Rio Tinto has an
elaborate corporate structure with shifting responsibilities
which can impede union efforts to mediate precarious
employment conditions, including the rise of contract
labour [97].
Job insecurity associated with contract or precarious
forms of employment has both financial and mental health
consequences [104], and can make workers more reluctant
to use sick leave [105]. This was a concern raised by one
Australian union respondent about precarious workers in
one of Rio Tinto’s operations, who contended ‘They are less
likely to report unsafe situations and far less likely to take
time off when they are sick or injured because they don’t
get paid for it’. Other potential problems include loss of ex-
pertise through loss of older workers, including occupa-
tional health and safety knowledge, leading to increased
exposure to hazardous substances and other risks from
‘corner cutting’ [105]. One Australian union representative
was also concerned at the lack of transparency in reporting
Rio Tinto’s growing proportion of sub-contractors com-
pared with directly-employed workers, claiming that this
‘creates two quite distinct classes of workers in the mining
industry’, thereby highlighting implications for health equity.
Another Australian union representative cited the lack of
guaranteed hours, lower superannuation payments, lack of
reimbursement for travelling time, and easier dismissal of
workers through third party sub-contracting arrangements.
People who are unemployed or lack job security consist-
ently report the lowest levels of subjective well-being and
self-rated health [106], and are at greater risk of mental
health problems [107].
In a 2012 submission to a government review of Austra-
lian labour law Rio Tinto declared that it is ‘committed to
establishing a direct relationship with every employee irre-
spective of the employment arrangement under which the
employee has been employed’ [108]. Rio Tinto’s preference
for individual contracts over union collective agreements
has led to the de-unionisation of much of its Australian
workforce [109]. This was a cross-jurisdictional concern
raised by a South African respondent:
The question around contract labour becomes even
more critical because that fundamentally undermines
the foothold of organised labour. Organised labour can
be a very powerful voice for both occupational health and
safety and for community impacts if people are living in
the area around the mines… And, also even though we
may be upper middle income we are one of the countries
with the greatest Gini Coefficient, so inequality inside our
country. So, that also very much shapes the dynamic in
the society…If you're sub-contracted then you're more vul-
nerable. You're certainly more vulnerable in terms of occu-
pational health and safety.
Research by Farber et al. (2018) highlights the critical
role of strong trade unions in mediating poor working
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conditions and inequality. These researchers found that
over the last nine decades, when unions expand at either
the national or state level, they tend to attract the mem-
bership of unskilled workers and increase their relative
wages, thereby helping to address inequality [110]. Con-
versely, where so-called ‘right-to-work’ legislation has
undermined the right to organise, occupational mortality
has risen, illustrating the protective effect of unions on
workplace safety [111].
Issues of occupational health and safety have been
raised in respect of uranium mining. Rössing in Namibia
is the fifth largest open pit uranium mine in the world.
Earthlife Namibia and Commission for Independent Re-
search and Information about Radiation (CRIIRAD) have
monitored areas located near uranium mines in
Namibia, especially Rössing. The dose rate measured in
2011 by CRIIRAD on the parking area of the Rössing
mine was approximately six times higher than natural
background value [112]. A Namibian activist highlighted
the associated negative aspects of employment in the ur-
anium industry:
They work eight hours in this toxic environment.
There is such a lot of dust. They are blasting and
they are moving and they are crushing and milling,
so everywhere is dust. This dust is full of toxic
particles and full of radioactive particles and we
have background radiation.
In a 2014 study carried out with present and former
Rössing workers, 39 of the 44 respondents complained
of health problems and difficult working conditions
causing back pain, breathing, hearing and visual prob-
lems. The biggest concern however was constant dust
exposure. Most workers also stated they were not in-
formed about their health conditions or exposure to ra-
diation. While some workers consulted a private doctor
for a second opinion, this is not an option that most
workers can afford [113].
Work, health and safety regulations across jurisdictions
Our data suggest there are significant difference between
work, health and safety regulations in Australia and
Southern Africa. In Australia Safe Work Australia is the
the national work, health and safety policy agency, with
regulation governed at the state and territory level under
10 separate statutes, with some variations in legal re-
quirements and enforcement. All Australian statutes
grant inspectors broad powers; including to issue im-
provement and prohibition notices and to prosecute
those found in breach of legislation [114]. The Inter-
national Labour Organisation (ILO) reports that in con-
trast, South Africa accident compensation may take
years, or may even never eventuate [115]. In South
Africa workers are mainly protected under the Occupa-
tional Health and Safety (OHSA) Act and the Mines
Health and Safety (MHSA) Act [116]. The OHSA Act
covers the non-mining sector whereas MHSA covers all
mining; but neither deals with workers’ compensation.
In South Africa compensation is governed by the Com-
pensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act
(for non-mining) and Occupational Diseases in Mines
and Works Act (for mining).
Due to enormous backlogs and lack of efficiency in
both compensation systems the current trend is civil liti-
gation. This has culminated, for example, in recent legal
settlements including US $400 million for tens of thou-
sands of South African gold miners who had contracted
silicosis [117]. Therefore, workers in both mining and
non-mining arguably get poor service for compensation
in both systems and the effectiveness of the MHSA as a
preventive tool for workers in the mining sector is de-
batable [118, 119]. Industriall Union claims gross viola-
tion of health and safety regulation for outsourced
workers at Richards Bay Minerals [97].
Exact comparisons between jurisdictions are difficult
due to factors including the type of mineral produced and
the level of mechanisation, but workplace fatalities in
South Africa’s mining industry are four times higher than
those in Australia [115]. A report by the NUM stated that
by 2013 the fatality rate in South Africa was 0,09 deaths
per million hours worked. While that is a steep improve-
ment from the 0,32 of 2003, it’s still ‘not a patch’ on Aus-
tralia’s 0,02 deaths per million hours [120]. Rio Tinto does
not report work, health and safety statistics nationally,
only globally, and at the local operational level. In 2017 it
reported both a safety-related and a health-related fatality
at its managed operations in Utah and Western Australia
respectively [43]. Three fatalities occurred at the opera-
tions of non-managed joint arrangements in Brazil, Papua
and Mozambique in 2017 [43].
Rio Tinto states that there was a 43% decrease in the
rate of new cases of occupational illness per 10,000
employees annually compared with 2016, and the all in-
juries frequency rate (AIFR) per 200,000 h worked
improved by 5% from 2016 [43]. Rio Tinto explains that
their data relating to the all injury frequency rate
includes all employee and contractor exposure hours
and incidents, but that new cases of occupational illness
are reported for employees only [43]. However, self-
reporting has serious limitations and independent moni-
toring and auditing would be preferable.
Social conditions
Impacts of extractive industry operations on social
conditions include the effects on local goods and
services and local community life. Rio Tinto’s Communi-
ties and Social Performance standards guide community
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relationships [121]. The corporation’s own literature
claims an extensive range of positive social contribu-
tions in its Australian, Southern African and Namibian
operations, including community development, educa-
tional, and Indigenous support projects [93]. One indi-
cative community support program is the funding by
Rio Tinto’s Western Australian Pilbara iron ore oper-
ation for educational initiatives including science,
technology, engineering and maths (STEM), school
readiness, and to improve educational attainment in
Indigenous populations, with a particular focus on the
Pilbara Aboriginal community. The other key focus is
enhancing community vibrancy through arts, culture
and sport as part of Au$17.9 million to 130 commu-
nity programmes and $9.8 million in-kind support in
Western Australia [122].
Several activists discussed health and social condi-
tions associated with coal mining in eastern Australia.
One union representative spoke positively of Rio
Tinto’s Australian contribution:
I think in general economic terms, Rio Tinto’s
involvement in Australia has been generally
positive. In some instances there have certainly been
very beneficial impacts upon the economic and
social health of some of the communities
in which they have operated.
A South African respondent noted positive social
impacts from Rio Tinto’s investment in the local
economy by engaging local service providers for site
rehabilitation and cleaning services. Another stated
that Richards Bay Minerals support bulk water
supply for the local municipality as part of their so-
cial labour plan (SLP) commitment. Rio Tinto
advises that in 2015 Rössing committed N$18
million (US$1,302,000) towards implementing com-
munity initiatives. The focus was on improved primary
and secondary education through the implementation
of learner and teacher support programmes, vocational
skills development, scholarships, apprenticeships and
local economic diversification. Other financial initia-
tives included minor contributions such as personal
health awareness, biodiversity protection through sup-
port of the annual birdwatching event; and waste man-
agement activities at local primary and secondary
schools [123].
Negative aspects of Rio Tinto’s operations in
Australia include the social upheaval on both Indigen-
ous and other Australians from the impact of the Ran-
ger Uranium mine [124], and communities in New
South Wales impacted by coal dust, noise, poor infra-
structure maintenance, and some even being forced out
of their homes, as an activist explained:
Solastalgia is the term, and he [psychologist] thinks it’s
suffered by people and that’s what we’re feeling about
[our town]. [Respondent reads aloud…] ‘Solastalgia is
an emplaced or existential melancholia. It’s a negative
transformation that is a desolation of
a loved home environment’. That’s the way we’re
feeling about our home.
One activist spoke of their efforts to be well-informed
about Rio Tinto’s operations in order to advocate for the
community; despite a strong sense of powerlessness:
We’ve become experts in fields that we never dreamt
of being experts in…We know that we are in the right but
the dealings of these multinational companies, they’re so
powerful with the government and we just
see that – you get that feeling that you just don’t matter.
You feel like collateral damage basically.
Other participants articulated more specific negative
health and social conditions linked to Rio Tinto’s Aus-
tralian coal mining operations:
We sleep with earplugs here. Our house is very, very
dusty…so we are living in a very dusty environment…
Our area has one of the highest asthma rates for 9-15
year olds in the state. It is pretty bad. We have dust
monitors around. We often have toxic fumes go up
after a blast.
Combining the research traditions of the sociology of
mental health and environmental inequality studies,
Downey and van Willegan (2005) examined the impact
of industrial activity on individual well-being and found
that it is associated with perceptions of individual
powerlessness and neighborhood disorder, leading to
higher levels of psychological distress [125, 126]. Con-
cepts of power, autonomy and control in exercising
choice are important factors in gaining access to re-
sources to promote and maintain health [127]. Health
inequalities are caused by the unequal distribution of
power, as well as goods and services, both globally and
nationally [128]. One respondent living with the health
impacts of coal mining in Australia spoke of adverse
mental health impacts, including feelings of grief and
loss and description of the ‘resettlement effect’ [26]:
You feel like you have a lot of the control of your life
lost, and feeling of not belonging, so there’s no
attachment any more. You feel the loss of time and
effort and energy and health, the environment and its
opportunities. You sort of feel like your future has been
stolen… forced out of our home…It’s just a big sense of
loss and grief.
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In Namibia, uranium workers housed in the township of
Arandis have historically been exposed to dust, and
radon gas with documented health impacts, especially
an increased risk of lung cancer [113, 129].
Environmental conditions
Rio Tinto states that it supports the Paris Agreement to
reduce global warming, and research into carbon capture
and storage and low emissions technologies. It provides
extensive information on maintaining sustainable opera-
tions and notes that it aims for substantial decarbonisation
by 2050 [93]. However, adverse environmental impacts are
documented in a Global Atlas of Rio Tinto’s site opera-
tions [130]. These include soil contamination, ground-
water pollution or depletion, and mine tailings spills at
Rössing in Namibia; and air pollution, biodiversity loss,
soil contamination and erosion, waste overflow, deforest-
ation and loss of vegetation cover and mine tailings spills
at Richards Bay in South Africa [131].
Richards Bay Minerals is one of four extractives indus-
tries that consume 60% of the available water supplied in
the Mhalatuzi district in KwaZulu Natal province. In
2015 it was reported that residents were facing water
restrictions due to drought conditions and the high
water use by the mining industry at Richards Bay. A civil
society activist in Namibia explained that the Rössing ur-
anium mine also uses scarce water and electricity re-
sources which affects the local community, and country
as a whole:
They use a lot of water in a water scarce country. They
demand one third of Namibia’s total water usage and
that’s a lot one third. That’s the same with electricity.
Then there is ground water contamination which is very,
very serious and the ground water is flowing very slowly
so it did not reach the coast. The mine is roundabout 60
kilometres east of the coast but there is a lot of east wind.
They have strong east winds from time to time and then
the dust, the particles, are blown by the wind to the
coastline and there are lots of towns.
Despite this, residents were concerned that forced min-
ing closure would have devastating social and economic
consequences [132].
In Australia the National Pollution Inventory high-
lights the high level of pollution associated with coal
mining in the Hunter Valley New South Wales [133].
More than 30,000 people live within 500m of coal rail
corridors, stockpiles or loading facilities in the greater
Hunter region. Exposure to airborne dust may trigger
asthma attacks and allergic reasons, contribute to
breathing-related problems and cardiovascular disease
and a reduced life span [134, 135].
Rio Tinto’s corporate literature reports contamination
of ground water in the Northern Territory at the Gove
Alumina refinery [136], and the Public Health Associ-
ation of Australia has reported on the high number of
significant environmental safety incidents at the Energy
Resources Australia’s Ranger Uranium Northern Terri-
tory operations [137]. Rio Tinto states that ‘We progres-
sively rehabilitate to the extent practicable’ [93], but a
key issue for civil society actors in both Australia and
Southern Africa is the lack of site rehabilitation, espe-
cially in respect of the massive ‘voids’ left by open cut
mines. An Australian respondent with an interest in
mining practices argued in respect of mining companies
more generally:
Mining companies, by and large, will defer any cost
that they can from today until tomorrow. And in order
to relinquish land it’s a significant cost. So they’re
deferring and deferring and deferring for later, and the
mine managers of the day have no incentive to do
otherwise. It is not in their brief.
An activist campaigning against the negative impacts
of the Rio Tinto coal mining operations stated:
It’s not just the [named mine]. It is the whole area, the
dust, the trees. They have a different look about them.
They’re choking. It’s just an appalling – the fact that we
have no policy on final voids and rehabilitation.
Another concurred:
You have no idea what these places [voids] look like.
They’re hundreds of metres deep; 10 kilometres by 5
kilometres hole in the ground…They put them into
what is called care and maintenance which means
they don’t actually close, that so that means they
don’t actually have to rehabilitate.
A similar concern was raised by a Namibian activist
over the environmental impacts from mining low-yield
uranium, and long-term implications for health:
Last year Rössing moved 14 to 15 million tonnes of
rock and earth to produce one tonne of uranium. You
can imagine how big the hole is and how big the waste
dump is, how big the tailings is, how much water they
use and how much electricity they use. All this is a
danger for Namibia…[The tailings are] a catastrophe
because it’s a huge area which gets contaminated and
that sinks into the ground, into the ground water
eventually. Also there is always seepage….What lining
will last for 200,000 years and who can maintain such
a thing?
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Other environmental concerns cited by respondents in
Australia included uranium tailing dams spills, the lack
of action on mitigating the impacts of climate change,
the threat to Aboriginal artefacts, destruction of critical
areas for endangered species habitat, and the lack of ef-
fective regulatory regimes to deal with hydraulic rock
fracturing [‘fracking’], air and water pollution, and other
systemic problems. An Australian activist made sugges-
tions for strengthening the regulatory landscape to deal
with these problems, arguing:
We need next-generation environmental laws, imposing
far stricter controls in relation to all forms of pollution
and the protection of biodiversity. We need a ban on the
opening of new coal mines and other fossil fuel resources
and a rapid but fair transition out of existing fossil fuel
mining operations.
Economic conditions
Rio Tinto’s operations have a significant impact on na-
tional and local economies and public revenue in the
countries in which they operate [138]. In Australia the
potential public benefits of the corporation’s economic
investment has been negatively affected by successful
lobbying by mining industry bodies and corporations to
promote a regulatory environment conducive to business
interests [80], and through its strategies to reduce cor-
porate taxation. For example, lobbying by Rio Tinto and
BHP Billiton to maintain cheap diesel for mining com-
panies costs Australian taxpayers over $4.5 billion per
year. The estimated loss from overturning the Minerals
Resource Rent Tax was $5.3 billion over the forward es-
timates [78]. An Australian Senate inquiry found that
Rio Tinto’s Singapore hub made a $790 million profit
but paid a 5 % tax rate in 2014 [139]. Adverse economic
impacts also result from the reduction in Rio Tinto’s glo-
bal workforce associated with the end of the ‘mining
boom’. This included a reduction of 1650 Australian
workers in 2016 as part of 4750 Australian jobs lost
since 2012 [140].
Other negative economic aspects include externalising
environmental costs onto Australian, South African, and
Namibian communities through a range of strategies
[130, 141, 142]. For example, in 2015, the New South
Wales government acknowledged that it would cost $2
billion to remediate one specific void from Rio Tinto’s
coal mining operations, but this has not eventuated;
leaving a negative legacy for the wider community [143].
A South African respondent cited economic stress from
a ‘boom and bust’ cycle which has resulted in scaling
down of operations and loss of employment at Richards
Bay Minerals. However, Rio Tinto states that while
challenges remain, particularly in the area of low market
prices which may persist for several years, the
longer-term outlook for the nuclear industry remains
positive [94].
The role of regulation
Evidence indicates that strong national (and sub-national)
regulation is required to mediate the health impacts of
TNCs [144] on health and equity. Australian activists
monitoring Rio Tinto’s coal mining operations spoke of
their ‘battle’ against the power of both Rio Tinto and
government:
In this battle along the way over the past eight years,
we actually ended up in the Land and Environment
Court where we won our case hands down. They
[Rio Tinto] got thrown out of court. They applied
again. They appealed so we went to the Supreme
Court of Appeal where we won again. So then after
that win, the government changed the goal post to
suit Rio Tinto. When they appealed, they appealed
the findings that they took away our right of merit
appeal so we were left - even though we were
winners in court, we were losers because they took
away our right of appeal.
An Australian union representative stated:
The problem is as much with the governments – be
they national, state or local – and their enforcement
of their own environmental guidelines, and in some
cases, a lack of environmental guidelines that allows
mining companies to do whatever they want and walk
away from the damage they have undertaken.
One Australian respondent shared a commonly held
view on the need for greater regulation, and reflected on
Rio Tinto’s political practice of using a peak body to ad-
vance policy positions not in keeping with its preferred
corporate image:
The existing regime of mining law in Australia is
entirely inadequate to the job of protecting the
environment…and there’s just the general problem
of corporations having too much power both in terms
of how their participation in the political process is
treated, the kind of tax breaks that are given to their
representative peak body... So one of the tricks Rio Tinto
[and other mining corporations] has played over the
years, is they’ll take a corporate view on one thing that
might be progressive but will then be paying money to a
peak body… which will be pursuing some sort of awful
troglodyte line on something, whether it’s Indigenous
affairs, the environment or climate change.
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Other regulatory concerns raised by respondents in-
cluded a lack of effective grievance mechanisms for
South African mining companies as a result of
under-resourcing of government inspectorates, and a
lack of parity between Rio Tinto’s global operations by
the limiting of action to minimum standards in each jur-
isdiction of operations. A South African respondent ex-
plained that mining company staff do not have the
training or expertise to comply with legislation and that
local municipalities lack resources, resulting in deficits
in planning and services:
In South Africa we have probably the most advanced
legislation in this area [social and labour plans].
However, it sounds good on paper. However, in practice
there are some really big problems. One of the problems
would be the expertise inside a company to be able to
drive this process efficiently, to understand what needs
to be done and how do you consult - you're required to
consult with the municipality and the community, and
how do you do that successfully? Then, the local
municipalities themselves are under-capacitated, so
they don't have often the necessary planning skills and
there are big deficits within their own expertise, and
sometimes capacity to deliver on basic services.
In Australia concerns were also raised about the lack
of enforcement of policies and regulations; especially in
respect of environmental concerns. In reflecting on the
multitude of concerns one Australian respondent from a
large NGO argued:
Ideally, there would be a change to the DNA of
business corporations so that instead of just being
responsible to shareholders that they also owed
fiduciary obligations to the communities around them
and to the environment. We need climate triggers in
relation to all new developments. We need a raft of
laws around shifting obligations back on to the powerful
and that’s in relation to labour but also in relation to
other areas.
Discussion
Here we present some general reflections on Rio Tinto’s
governance practices and performance related to health
and health equity, compare performance across jurisdic-
tions, and consider the influence of national and inter-
national governance frameworks.
Rio Tinto generally operates in accord with the regula-
tory requirements of the three selected jurisdictions. It also
commits to corporate social responsibility in a range of
areas, which are positive for health. These include applying
a code of conduct for companies operating in Rio Tinto’s
supply chain, and a range of activities under its Communi-
ties and Social performance standards. However, specific
corporate social responsibility initiatives may be under-
mined by financial accounting practices [145], or alliances
with industry bodies promoting policies antithetical to
population health [78]. Furthermore, our comparative as-
sessment indicates that Rio Tinto generally does just what
is needed to meet regulatory requirements in the countries
where it operates, rather than apply consistent corporate
standards, meaning that practices related to health are
generally of a lower standard in both South Africa and
Namibia compared to Australia, because regulatory frame-
works are limited or not as well enforced or resourced, or
union support is weaker.
Two key areas where we found decidedly mixed per-
formance for health were in employment, and environ-
mental performance. Employment is an important
determinant of health. Rio Tinto is a major employer in
Australia and a significant employer in Southern Africa,
and in both cases positively addresses equity by employ-
ing people from groups with otherwise limited oppor-
tunity. However, the apparent corporate strategy to shift
major elements of its workforce in all selected jurisdic-
tions to third-party contract arrangements is a signifi-
cant negative for health and likely to create a gap
between groups of workers in terms of remuneration,
job security and/or working conditions. This represents
a transfer of corporate responsibility to labour hire com-
panies, individual workers, subsidiary companies, and
supply chains [146].
Adverse health impacts on contracted Rio Tinto
workers, including after they cease employment, may be
overlooked in corporate self-assessment or reporting.
Again, the negative implications of this gap for disadvan-
taged workers are likely to be generally worse for
workers in South Africa and Namibia. Here the power of
workers to achieve terms and conditions of work condu-
cive to health, or seek compensation is relatively worse,
and these processes play out against a background of
greater social and economic inequality.
The fact that Rio Tinto is a signatory to agreements on
climate change is positive, although it is difficult to judge
its performance in this area from the evidence we gath-
ered. However, our research indicates a range of adverse
impacts both in terms of long-term, un-remediated
damage to environments in the vicinity of mine sites
and associated damage to physical and psychological
health for communities living in those areas. Corporate
strategies of ‘maintaining’ rather than closing mines
where production has ceased, or sale of assets to other
companies provide a means to avoid liabilities for site
remediation. Again, the effect of such strategies can be
to shift costs to governments (and taxpayers) and
communities. Also, inconsistencies have been found
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between how companies, including Rio Tinto, rank
their application of widely-used sustainability guide-
lines and publicly available information that is used for
verification [147]. We did not identify any evidence to
suggest environmental performance is markedly worse or
better in any of the jurisdictions studied – there are signifi-
cant problems in all three countries.
In economic and political terms, Rio Tinto’s contribu-
tions to economic activity and government revenues
within the three selected jurisdictions have the potential
for broader benefits for health, by stimulating wider em-
ployment opportunities and/or providing revenues for
government expenditure on social determinants of
health such as education and primary health care. How-
ever, Rio Tinto’s political and business practices also
raise concerns, especially it relation to strategies to shift
profits and reduce taxes paid, and use of lobby groups as
a front to influence government policies and pursue
commercial interests [78] while also protecting the cor-
porate image. Potential conflicts of interest in relation to
university funding and the level of corporate influence
over government policy pose serious threats to health.
Our research highlights that actual and /or potential
conflicts of interest occurred within the context of lobby-
ing governments and regulatory bodies, and from partner-
ships with universities. Codes of conduct are necessary in
both the public the private sector to combat malfeasance
and corporate fraud [148]. Several international organisa-
tions, including the United Nations Convention Against
Corruption (UNCAC), have developed guidelines and de-
vised protocols to assist standardising definitions and
adopting preventive and enforcement mechanisms [148].
Governments should adopt clear policy/guideline/legal
frameworks for preventing, detecting and managing con-
flicts of interest to ensure both the causes and effects are
properly addressed [148].
One avenue for aiding transparency and avoiding con-
flicts of interest in extractive industries would be to
mandate that annual reports include a section on the
health and welfare of the workers and communities adja-
cent to work sites compiled by independent civil society
actors without any conflict of interest. This reporting
would both augment and contextualise corporations’
documentation of the social, economic and health im-
pacts of their products and operations.
Policies that may assist in making extractive industry’s
operations more health promoting
In assessing both the benefits and negative impacts that
TNCs generate, there are ways in which business can be
conducted with fewer health impacts (See Table 3). For
example, TNCs should be required to pay tax at the
point of profit generation and thereby contribute to that
country’s public good. Restrictions should be imposed
on the ability of corporations to lobby governments and
unduly influence the democratic process. More attention
should be given to employment conditions which are be-
ing eroded by increased sub-contracting and the impact
of ‘Fly in fly out’ operations on families and communi-
ties. Rio Tinto’s practice of ‘direct engagement’ with
workers arguably undermines the recognised role of
unions in protecting workers’ best interests. Stringent
environmental controls should be mandated and moni-
tored by government in respect of both compliance and
the level of impact on local communities.
Research limitations
A major limitation of our research was the
non-participation of Rio Tinto or industry representatives
in the interviews. While this limited our access to an in-
dustry view on the health impact of their operations, the
research shows that it is possible to obtain sufficient sali-
ent material on TNCs from extensive publicly available
sources, as identified in our study on McDonald’s in
Australia [10, 34] and in earlier research by others on Wal-
mart [149]. As Rio Tinto uses professional image manage-
ment to prevent and manage risk [150], this may account
for their decision to not engage. Understood through a
power lens this is just one of the ways by which powerful
actors can influence research [151]. Other limitations were
that there was no specific policy, proposal or decision
point the CHIA process was trying to influence, nor an ex-
plicit advocacy process, nor was it community-led. There-
fore, processes concerning weighting of evidence,
engagement, governance structures, and managing conflict
or disagreement did not need to be established.
Table 3 Recommendations for improved regulation of
extractive industries
• Adopt clear government policy/guideline/legal framework on
preventing, detecting and managing conflict of interest
• Develop an international agreement to ensure that all taxes are
paid in country of profit generation
• Cease inequitable taxpayer funded extractive industry subsidies
• Restrict government lobbying undermining the democratic process
• Halt the erosion of employment conditions through contracting
• Mandate greater environmental controls including reduction in
greenhouse gas emissions
• Counterbalance fiduciary duty to shareholders with social
obligations to local communities
• Prevent the use of voluntary codes to undermine or prevent
enactment of legislation
• Develop an independent auditing process to ensure that TNCs
comply with their stated commitments
• Endorse the proposed UN Binding Treaty on Business and
Human Rights
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Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that it is possible to identify
potential and actual health impacts of an extractive in-
dustry TNC operating across different jurisdictions. It al-
lows for an overall understanding on the health impacts,
based on assessing corporate literature and with add-
itional data collection from key informants. Identifying
the positive and negative health impacts from Rio Tin-
to’s operations by utilising the CHIA framework may po-
tentially assist governments and international bodies to
devise appropriate regulatory frameworks, and provide
TNCs with insights to augment corporate social respon-
sibility initiatives, enhance their social licence to operate,
and provide decision-making support. Civil society ac-
tors and trade unions may benefit from an increased evi-
dence base by which to inform their advocacy towards
improved social and health investment and equity out-
comes [10].
This research highlights the need for strong regulatory
frameworks to help support positive health impacts and
avoid or mitigate negative impacts from corporate oper-
ations. If Rio Tinto and other TNCs were also mandated
to make reparation for externalising the economic, social
and environmental costs of their operations the situation
could be very different.
Civil society will continue to play a role in advocating
for necessary change, as will the actions of interventionist
governments. Existing voluntary codes should be seen as
adjuncts to properly enforced protective regulations, not
as alternatives. Under the UN Global Compact business
actors represent the majority of participants, with civil so-
ciety organisations taking a secondary role in assisting cor-
porations meet established goals and maintain code
legitimacy. This raises questions concerning the relative
power of civil society in global governance more generally.
On the other hand, the UN work developing a Binding
Treaty on Business and Human Rights affords much
greater civil society input to the work of the open-ended
intergovernmental working group (OEIGWG) on trans-
national corporations and other business enterprises with
respect to human rights [152]. As a result, the elements
being developed for this legally binding instrument offer
greater enforcement capacity and meaning [153, 154].
The Binding Treaty has its genesis in the UN Norms
on Transnational Corporations and Other Business En-
terprises which sought to impose on companies the
same duties as states to promote, secure and respect
human rights. This was followed by The UN Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights, or guidelines
for states and businesses to prevent, address and remedy
human rights abuses committed in business operations
[155]. In 2015 the UN Working Group on Business and
Human rights negotiated to develop and mandate an
international legally Binding Treaty to respond to the
inherent limitations of guiding principles and other vol-
untary initiatives [156]. This remains a work in progress.
Extractive industry and other TNCs will continue to
be an important part of the global economic system, if
only because complex societies need the logistics and ef-
ficiencies they can deliver. However, there is a crucial
and legitimate role for public health advocates and re-
searchers in posing questions about the extent of their
power and the way that this can undermine population
health [157]. Despite undertaking corporate social
responsibility initiatives the corporate entity ultimately
functions to serve its own interests, and has no real al-
ternative when confronted with an option between profit
and social good [158]. Global companies have ‘taken on
the mantle’ of central organisers of the global economy,
in addition to national economies. They determine ‘who
gets what’, but remain relatively understudied compared
with state and society [159]. Our research augments this
literature.
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